Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives, March 29, 2010.
(05/01/2014)
Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in Congresses, in part because of disputes over reporting to Congress by intelligence community (IC) components on sensitive matters, including developments generated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The changes in the oversight structure adopted or proposed in the 110th and 111th Congresses, however, reflect earlier concerns. For instance, the House Democratic majority had pledged in the 110th Congress to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its unanimous 2004 report set the stage for...
Tác giả: Kaiser, F. M. |
Số trang: 34 |
Lĩnh vực: Kinh tế |
Năm XB: 2010 |
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Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in Congresses, in part because of disputes over reporting to Congress by intelligence community (IC) components on sensitive matters, including developments generated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The changes in the oversight structure adopted or proposed in the 110th and 111th Congresses, however, reflect earlier concerns. For instance, the House Democratic majority had pledged in the 110th Congress to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its unanimous 2004 report set the stage for a reconsideration of congressional oversight, concluding that it was dysfunctional. The commission proposed two distinct solutions: (1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence (JCI), modeled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), with authority to report legislation to each chamber; or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting each one both authorization and appropriations power. A follow-up effort in 2010, headed by the co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, observed that although some progress has been made in overseeing intelligence, the related field of homeland security reflected a jurisdictional melee among fractured and overlapping jurisdictions (contributing to) an unworkable system. Another 2010 studyby the Commission on WMDconcluded that Congress has been slow to reform itself and that congressional oversight remains dysfunctional.
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